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Robson 1 
The nature of deity through out the history of 
philosophy has always been a subject of debate, from some 
of the earliest writings, philosophers and theologians 
have given arguments for and against the existence and 
nature of God. Beckwith and Parrish, in The Mormon 
Concept Of God. A Philosophical Analysis, add another 
page to this on-going debate with their attack of the 
"Mormon concept of God." In the introduction Beckwith 
and Parrish explain that it is their aim to show 
(1) that the Mormon concept of God differs 
radically from the classical concept of God, 
(2) that the Mormon concept of God contains many 
philosophical flaws, 
(3) that the classical concept of God is more 
consistent with the Christian Scriptures than 
the Mormon view. (Beckwith 1) 
Another apparent aim of Beckwith and Parrish's book is the 
defence of the classical concept of God. 
This paper will analyze the philosophical arguments and 
examples used by Beckwith and Parrish and will demonstrate 
that these arguments are not compelling enough to achieve 
their goals. To achieve this in an orderly fashion the 
structure of this paper will follow that of Beckwith and 
Parrish's book. 
This work is offered not as an apologetic paper but 
rather as a critical review of Beckwith and Parrish's 
philosophical arguments. It will focus on the first three 
chapters of the book ("The Classical Concept of God, Mormon 
Finitistic Theism," and, "Philosophical Problems with the 
Mormon Concept of God"). The reason for this is that the 
Robson 2 
forth chapter of Beckwith and Parrish's book deals with 
arguments for the existence of God, using arguments already 
voiced in the prior three chapters. The last chapter of the 
book argues against the Mormon concept of God using scriptural 
interpretation rather then philosophical argument. 
In the first chapter of Beckwith and Parrish's book 
entitled "The Classical Concept of God," they present the 
classical concept of God and the criticisms given by Mormons 
which they believe could be "damaging to classical theism" 
(Beckwith 7). There are ten key traits, as Beckwith and 
Parrish see it, to the classical concept of God. 
The first of these is that God is "personal and 
disembodied" (Beckwith 8), meaning that God does not have a 
physical presence (a spirit) but God does "act," "love," 
"know," and "chose" (Beckwith 8) . In other words, God 
"possesses rationality" (Beckwith 8). 
The second trait of the classical God is that God is "the 
creator and sustainer of all contingent existence" (Beckwith 
8). By this Beckwith and Parrish mean that God is "not 
dependent on anything else for His being God" or that "He 
lacks nothing" (Beckwith 9). Not only is He not dependent on 
anything else but everything is dependent on Him. God created 
everything out of nothing (ex nihilo). Beckwith and Parish 
point out that Blake Ostler (a defender of the Mormon concept 
of God) has argued that it makes no logical sense to claim 
that a being that lacks nothing made our world. The argument 
simply put says that "every positive action requires an 
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explanation sufficient to account for it" (Beckwith 8), and if 
it is assumed that the creation of world is a positive thing, 
then it follows that there must an "explanation sufficient to 
account for" why God created the world. A being that lacks 
nothing, Ostler argues, would not have a sufficient reason for 
doing such a thing. Beckwith and Parrish suggest that Ostler 
is confusing the meaning of sufficient in "self-sufficient" 
with sufficient in "sufficient reason." They go on to claim 
that "God's sufficient reason to create the universe is simply 
that He desired to do so for his own pleasure although if He 
had created nothing whatsoever He would have not ceased 
possessing the attributes of God" (Beckwith 9). The problem 
with this explanation is that it plays right into Ostler's 
argument. If God's pleasure is not dependent on whether or 
not God created our world then what was God's reason for doing 
so? The only possible answer is that God created this world 
on a whim. This leaves Beckwith and Parrish with a whimsical 
God. 
Omnipotence is the third trait of Beckwith and Parrish's 
concept of the classical God. God is all-powerful in the 
sense that "God can do anything that is (1) logically possible 
and (2) is consistent with Hirn being a wholly perfect, 
personal, disembodied, omniscient, immutable and necessary 
creator" (Beckwith 10). Beckwith and Parrish claim that these 
are not limiting factors, they are instead "perfections ... 
which are essential to God's nature" (Beckwith 10). However 
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they give no other explanations as to why these are not 
limiting factors (especially with regards to (2)). 
The forth trait of the classical concept of God is that 
God is omniscient, Beckwith and Parrish explain that "the 
range of his [God's] knowledge is total; He knows all true 
propositions" (Beckwith 11). God knows everything past, 
present, and future, and He knows it immediately; there are no 
physical mediums by which God obtains his knowledge. Those 
who have accepted God's perfect knowledge of the future have 
always had a problem reconciling that trait with human 
freedom. Beckwith and Parrish try to brush off this ancient 
dilemma simply by saying that "just because something 
definitely will happen does not mean that it must happen" 
(Beckwith 13). An example of what they mean by this 
statement and how it would be applied to God is that I could 
have gone hiking yesterday rather then working on this paper, 
and that if I had chosen to have gone hiking, God's knowledge 
of what action I would take would have been different. 
"God," they claim, "knows what will happen because we will 
freely act in a certain way, not because we must act in a 
certain way" (Beckwith 13). All that their defence would 
really provides us with is apparent freedom. If God has known 
since I was born that I would spend yesterday working on this 
paper, then there was no chance at all that I would have done 
otherwise. If God knows that I will do such and such tomorrow 
then I will do such and such tomorrow, no matter how I make 
the decision or how free to make that decision I feel. 
Robson 5 
From the traits--omniscience, disembodiment, omnipotence, 
and creator and sustainer of the universe--Beckwith and 
Parrish claim that the fifth trait logically follows. God 
is, they claim, "in some sense present everywhere" (Beckwith 
14), or omnipresent. 
The sixth trait is that of God's immutability. Beckwith 
and Parrish clarify this by saying that God can be immutable 
and still interact with his creation and be personal. It 
seems that the term immutable is applied to God's moral traits 
and not his actions. God's immutability however may be in 
conflict with the seventh of God's traits, his eternal nature. 
In classical theism to say that God is eternal is to say 
that God is outside of time and not affected or bound by it. 
The conflict is 'how can God be eternal--completely outside of 
time--and still act within time? This too is an ancient 
problem; the concept of a timeless being dates back to the 
Greeks and appears to have been picked up by early Christians. 
In response to these objections Beckwith and Parrish propose 
this answer: Since God knew even before He created the world 
exactly what would happen then He could have simultaneously 
created the world and sent forth all his actions within the 
world. This argument claims that God would therefore not be 
acting within time and therefore not be violating His eternal 
nature. Nicholas Wolterstorff (Himself a classical theist) in 
his article "God Everlasting" explains that even if one were 
to accept the answer that Beckwith and Parrish espouse, they 
would be still stuck with a God that has a time-strand. 
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Wolterstorff points out that "at least some of his [God's] 
aspects stand in temporal order-relations to each other" 
(Wolterstorff 202) and therefore God "is fundamentally in 
time" (Wolterstorff 200). 
Beckwith and Parrish mention another objection that 
Ostler makes with regards to the classical concept of God. 
Ostler says that "the idea of a God who is in no place and in 
no time is an idea of no God" and" there is no way to 
distinguish Him from any other entity" (Beckwith 17). 
Beckwith and Parrish's answer to this objection is that 
"Ostler has not sufficiently demonstrated why bodily extension 
is a necessary condition for personal identity" (Beckwith 18). 
Beckwith and Parrish have adopted one of the traditional 
arguments for the existence of God to demonstrate that it is 
possible for there to exist a eternal and disembodied entity. 
Their version of the traditional argument is: 
1. Everything that begins to exist does so only through 
a cause. 
2. The universe had a beginning. 
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. 
4. There cannot exist an infinite regress of causes in 
time. 
5. Therefore, the cause of the universe is eternal and 
uncaused, from which we can infer particular attributes. 
(Beckwith 19) 
If one accepts this argument Beckwith and Parrish suggest that 
they could infer that God is timeless (or at least could be) , 
that God is disembodied, and that God is personal. God is or 
at least could be timeless because if time did not exist 
before the universe was created then God was timeless, and 
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they, suggest still could be. As pointed out previously 
however, if God acts in any way at all, God has a time-strand. 
Their second inference, that God is disembodied, arises 
from the fact that "since physical reality began with the 
beginning of the universe" (Beckwith 20) anything prior to 
that--the cause--must not have been physical. God, they say, 
is personal because the creation has to have been a deliberate 
act of a free entity. This point like the rest of the 
argument must be taken only as a possibility with a lot of 
'ifs' attached. For example even if one accepts the argument 
it could be argued that the first cause was not the act of a 
free rational entity but rather it may have only been an 
accident. 
The eighth trait that Beckwith and Parrish attribute to 
God is that God is "the source of all values and perfectly 
good" (Beckwith 22). All values come from God but they are 
not arbitrary; they come from God's very nature, God being 
perfectly good. God is subject to these values as He is 
subject to his own nature, but they are not above Him as they 
are apart of Him. 
Beckwith and Parrish's ninth trait is that God is "able 
to communicate with humans" (Beckwith 23). This of course 
follows as a fact that God is omnipotent and would be disputed 
by few theists; it never the less remains a problem if one 
still suggests that God is timeless. 
The last trait that Beckwith and Parrish propose is that 
God is the "necessary and only God" (Beckwith 24). By this 
Robson 8 
they indicate that they mean that God is not simply a 
factually necessary being, but that God is in fact the 
logically necessary being and the maximally greatest being. 
Following the same order of traits found in chapter one, 
Beckwith and Parrish analyze "Mormon finitistic theism" in 
chapter two. Beckwith and Parrish point out in the 
introduction to the second chapter that because Mormonism is a 
religion and that its doctrines are spread out through many 
works it is difficult to say authoritatively exactly what its 
theology is. 
First, God is personal in both classical and Mormon 
theology but, Beckwith and Parrish point out, God is not 
disembodied in Mormon theology. God has a "body of flesh and 
bones" (Beckwith 39). 
Second, in contrast to the classical God who created the 
world out of nothing, the Mormon God is said to be the 
"organizer of the world ... subject to the laws and principles 
of a beginningless universe" (Beckwith 39). Beckwith and 
Parrish quote Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism, as 
saying that God "organized and reorganized" (Beckwith 39) the 
universe out of already existing elements. They say that 
here Mormon and classical theism stand in the starkest 
contradiction. Not only do Mormons deny the doctrine of 
creation out of nothing, but they also deny that God has 
anything to do with sustaining the universe. As far as 
the existence of matter and energy goes, it is totally 
beyond God's control. (Beckwith 40) 
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It is interesting to note the difference in perspective here 
between the classical and Mormon theist. After three quotes 
explaining the Mormon position that God organizes the matter 
and energy to create the universe, Beckwith and Parrish claim 
that the Mormon God has nothing to do with sustaining the 
universe because He did not create it ex nihilo. The Mormon 
theist would say that God does support the universe because 
without God there would only be chaos not the universe that we 
know. This might be rather inconsequential but it does help 
point out the difficulty of contrasting two theologies that 
are based on very different metaphysical foundations. This is 
a problem that shows up over and over in Beckwith and 
Parrish's book. 
Third, the trait of omnipotence takes on a much different 
meaning in the Mormon tradition. Beckwith and Parrish point 
out that the Mormon God can do only that which is possible, 
which as we have just seen means that the Mormon God can not 
create or destroy matter; He is in fact bound by certain 
natural laws. 
With regards to the forth trait, omniscience, Beckwith 
and Parrish point out that there is not a consensus within 
Mormonism. However because the classical view of omnipotence 
has already been covered, they focus on the rival view that 
they believe to be dominate within Mormonism. This view is 
that God knows all that is possible for Him to know. Because 
the future has not yet occurred and humans have freewill it is 
suggested that God can not know exactly what will happen in 
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the future. His Knowledge is therefore limited to the past 
and present. 
Fifth God is "not omnipresent in being" (Beckwith 42). 
According to Mormon theology God has a body. Beckwith and 
Parrish say that "when a Mormon says that God is omnipresent 
He is asserting that God's influence, power, and knowledge is 
all-pervasive" ( Beckwith 43). Omnipresence in the Mormon 
tradition is limited to "God's Spirit, or Influence or Power" 
(Beckwith 42). God's body, however, is in only one place at a 
time. 
Sixth and seventh, God has always existed but in contrast 
with the immutable God of classical theology the Mormon God 
has not always been God but rather He achieved that status. 
Eighth, the Mormon God being subject to eternal principles is 
not the source of all values as the classical God is. God 
holds these values and is bound by them but they are external 
to Him. On the ninth trait, Beckwith and Parrish find 
agreement between classical theism and Mormon theism in that 
God can communicate with humans; the difference is in how God 
does so, but this is not important for our discussion. 
"All of this," as Beckwith and Parrish explain, "brings 
us to a very important distinction between the God of the 
Mormons and the God of classical theism" (Beckwith 45). This 
distinction is that the God of classical theism is logically 
necessary(the tenth trait) and therefore the only God. On the 
other hand the Mormons' God is necessary only in the sense 
that He has always existed along with all of the other beings 
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and elements. Mormonism also proposes that there are other 
Gods, who also came to be Gods just as our God did, and 
Mormons admit that it is possible that had God had some 
failure in the past He may not have become God. 
In the third chapter there are four arguments proposed by 
Beckwith and Parrish to discredit the Mormon theory of God. 
Of those only one deals directly with one of God's traits; the 
other three attack the metaphysical groundings of Mormon 
theology. The arguments are as follows: 
1. The impossibility of an infinite series of events in 
the past. 
2. The impossibility of an eternal progression in a 
beginningless series of events. 
3. The impossibility of an actual infinite number of 
things in the material world. 
4. The impossibility of achieving omniscience in time 
and space. 
The first of these arguments is presented in this form: 
1. The series of events in time is a collection formed 
by adding one member after another. 
2. A collection formed by adding one member after 
another cannot be actually infinite. 
3. Therefore, the series of events in time cannot be 
actually infinite. (Beckwith 54) 
Beckwith and Parrish seem to believe that a series of events 
in time is similar to a box of marbles, and that we will never 
achieve an infinite number of marbles in time by adding them 
one at a time. It would appear that what this argument is 
actually saying is that one can not achieve a infinite number 
of events in a finite period of time. The time-strand is made 
up not only of events that have occurred one after another but 
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also of events that have occurred simultaneously. Events are 
not added like marbles; they do not occur not one at a time. 
You may have an infinite number of events occurring within a 
finite period of time. Now change that finite period of time 
to an infinite one, and you can easily see how an infinite 
number of events can occur. Ernest Nagel suggests that the 
idea that there must be a first cause is obscured. Nagel 
explains that 
the argument is an ancient one, and is especially 
effective when stated within the framework of assumptions 
of Aristotelian physics; and it has impressed many 
generations of exceptionally keen minds. The argument is 
nonetheless a week reed on which to rest the theistic 
thesis. Let us wave any question concerning the validity 
of a first cause .... However, if the principle is 
assumed, it is surely incongruous to postulate a first 
cause as a way of escaping from the coils of an infinite 
series. For even if everything must have a cause, why 
does not God require one for His own existence? The 
standard answer is that He does not need any, because He 
is self-caused. But if God can be self caused, why 
cannot the world be self-caused? On the other hand, the 
supposed inconceivability and absurdity of an infinite 
series of regressive causes will be admitted by no one 
who has competent familiarity with the modern 
mathematical analysis of infinity. (Nagel 7) 
It should also be pointed out again that the classical God has 
not escaped time, and if He has existed forever He would also 
be subject to the same argument that Beckwith and Parrish 
propose for Mormon theism. Can one actually cross an infinite 
series of steps? The real question it would seem in this case 
would be can the elements rather then the classical God be 
eternal in that they have always existed and will continue to 
do so? Beckwith and Parrish give no reason as to why this can 
not be the case. 
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The second argument that Beckwith and Parrish present is 
what they call "the impossibility of an eternal progression in 
a beginningless series of events" (Beckwith 59). They divide 
this into three separate arguments. The first is "on reaching 
our inevitable goal" (Beckwith 60). Beckwith and Parrish 
suggest that "if the past series of events in time is 
infinite, we should have all reached our inevitable fate by 
now" (Beckwith 60). Beckwith and Parrish seem to have missed 
an important correlation in that their very next argument is 
"on an infinite number of Gods and an infinite number of 
intelligences" (Beckwith 61). In which they insist that 
according to Mormon theology there must be an infinite number 
of intelligences. If there are an infinite number of 
intelligences then it seem to reason that all of them could 
not have yet reached their fate. If there are already an 
infinite number of Gods who once were simply intelligences and 
assuming that all the intelligences did not become Gods then 
the infinite past would have been quite busy. The third point 
that they make is that there would be an "infinite number of 
remaining intelligences." This point would seem to be a 
clarification and not an argument. 
The third major argument against the Mormon theology, 
that Beckwith and Parrish present, is "the impossibility of an 
actual infinite number of things in the material universe" 
(Beckwith 63). In this argument they attempt to show that an 
infinite number of things is in fact absurd. To do this they 
propose several examples that harken back to Galileo's 
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paradox. The examples all follow the form of there being an 
infinite set and a separate subset of that set (in some of the 
examples the subset is finite in some it is said to be 
infinite). The question arises when the subset is removed 
from the set. The set is still said to be infinite even 
though it is lacking In Galileo's example the set can be 
represented by all numbers and the subset by the even ones. 
Both the set and the subset could be said to be infinite even 
though it would seem that the subset should be only half as 
many as the set. There are two problems with this argument: 
First the impossibility of division, and second the question 
of the validity of the paradox. First if the Mormon view is 
accepted then what we are dealing with is an infinite number 
of objects within an infinite space. If this is the case then 
there is no way of physically dividing sets and subsets. The 
second is an answer that James Thompson explains in response 
to the problem proposed by Galileo, that what I've been 
calling a subset is not actually a proper subset but a 
separate set in itself (Thompson 185) . 
The last argument that Beckwith and Parrish propose is 
that it is impossible for the Mormon God to achieve 
omniscience in time and space (Beckwith 71). This argument if 
correct does not rule out the Mormon God but rather it would 
only perhaps discredit Him. The argument states that because 
God has a body and is limited by time He can not possibly know 
every thing that is happening instantaneously. The fact that 
God has a body is an interesting argument for Beckwith and 
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Parrish to bring up, because as they pointed out earlier the 
term omnipresence in respect to the Mormon God refers to God's 
Spirit, not his body. As for the problem of time if the 
Mormon God's Spirit is omnipresent then time is not a factor 
any more for the Mormon God then it is for the classical God. 
Beckwith and Parrish have only succeeded in adequately 
achieving one of their three goal that are covered in this 
paper. They did succeed in showing that "the Mormon concept 
of God differs radically from the classical concept of God" 
(Beckwith 1), but this was a given. They have raised some 
questions about infinate sets but have not adequately shown 
that "the Mormon concept of God contains many philosophical 
flaws" (Beckwith). And they have not adequately defended the 
traditional concept of God; leaving doubt as to: Why God 
created anything? How human freedom is compatible with His 
omniscience? And how God can be outside of time? 
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